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ABSTRACT
Untapped markets are often deemed institutional voids, terra incognita ripe
with economic possibility. The conversion of institutional voids into viable
markets has become the ambition of many corporations today, which view
marginal and under-served areas such as urban slums as opportunities to
achieve the dual aims of market growth and poverty reduction, particularly
through ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP) programmes. This article examines
how firms manage institutional voids and the consequences of these ap-
proaches for workers through a case study of a BoP ‘route to market’ pro-
gramme designed by a global food manufacturer in Kibera, Africa’s largest
slum, located in Nairobi. Instead of engaging with Kibera by upgrading in-
formal markets or generating formal employment, the corporation focused
on harnessing existing informal systems through composite arrangements of
NGOs, social networks and informal enterprises, a strategy the authors term
‘remote (dis)engagement’. The article describes the logics and outcome of
this strategy of formal engagement with informal markets, concluding that
the BoP business model depends on ‘gig practices’ of flexibility, irregular
work and insecurity to realize the much-heralded ‘fortune at the bottom of
the pyramid’.
INTRODUCTION
In the vernacular of multinational business, untapped markets are often de-
scribed as institutional voids — spaces marked by the absence of the for-
mal institutions, intermediaries and infrastructures needed to bring goods
to market (Khanna and Palepu, 2010), a terra incognita of under-served
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consumers ripe with economic possibility. The conversion of institutional
voids into viable markets has become central to the new mission of inclu-
sive business, which frames marginal and under-served areas such as urban
slums and off-grid rural areas as opportunities to achieve the dual aims of
market growth and poverty reduction, particularly through ‘bottom of the
pyramid’ (BoP) programmes. It is precisely corporations’ perceptions of
these frontier spaces (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Johnson, 2010) that frames
the rationale for the kind of corporate engagement with precarious workers
that would be deemed unacceptable or unlawful in the formal economy.
In examining these practices, this article draws attention to the interaction
of the private sector with extant social infrastructures in BoP programmes
(Dolan and Rajak, 2018; Elyachar, 2012; Paek, 2017). It poses two ques-
tions. Firstly, how do corporations draw on social infrastructures to close
the gap between Western-style markets and the on-the-ground realities of
informal economies in BoP environments? Secondly, what are the conse-
quences of this approach for the workers (hereafter also referred to as sell-
ers) involved; in other words, how are the risks and rewards of working at
the bottom of the pyramid distributed?
To pursue these questions the article draws on an in-depth case study of
Project Insansa, a BoP ‘route to market’ (RTM) programme designed by a
fast-moving consumer goods company and global food manufacturer that
we will call Food Co.,1 which seeks to reorient the purpose and processes
of capitalism through its organizational principle of ‘mutuality’. The article
traces Food Co.’s efforts to operate in Kibera — a vast slum in Nairobi,
Kenya, which constitutes a paradigmatic ‘institutional void’ — through
Project Insansa’s RTM programme, which provides the under- and unem-
ployed poor with opportunities to sell Food Co. products.
Food Co. does not engage with the BoP by extending its own formal dis-
tribution systems or by upgrading informal systems in under-served mar-
kets. Nor does the company invest in physical infrastructure within Kibera
to build its global business or upgrade the conditions associated with precar-
ious employment. Instead, the company draws on existing organizations and
individuals within these spaces, tapping into informal systems of ‘people
as infrastructure’ (Simone, 2004: 407). Food Co. co-opts the informal insti-
tutional infrastructure of ‘remote’ areas — social networks, long-standing
systems of trust and reciprocity and existing informal market relations —
harnessing informal labour markets as part of the value proposition for vi-
able access to informal consumer markets. Leveraging the social infrastruc-
tures of the poor, a common strategy of participatory development (Beall,
2001; Bebbington, 2002; Fine, 2002) especially in the context of micro-
finance (Maclean, 2010; Mader, 2015; Schuster, 2015), is also central to the
1. As required by our funding agreement, we have replaced the names of the company, its
programmes and its employees with pseudonyms.
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employment generation and consumer provisioning of the BoP, with varying
objectives (Dolan and Roll, 2013; Elyachar, 2005; Meagher, 2018).
From the perspective of BoP initiatives, Africa’s vast reservoir of ‘under-
utilized’ labour is perceived as a limitless resource base, valued as a low-
cost asset for new entrepreneurial ventures (Dolan and Roll, 2013; Meagher,
2016; Vachani and Smith, 2008: 76) and, as discussed here, is embraced as
a pool of informal institutional resources for penetrating institutional voids.
Drawing on workers’ own connections and relationships or ‘social capital’,
spliced together with partnering local NGOs, enables Food Co. to mini-
mize the direct social, managerial and legal costs associated with the pro-
gramme,2 which, the company suggests, would otherwise make operating in
these areas prohibitive. While harnessing the social infrastructure of infor-
mal actors enables the company to defray the costs of operating in Kibera,
it also circumvents state-mandated regulations and protections, converting
employment by formal sector firms into informal work.
In contrast to the ideal of market inclusion that BoP programmes such
as Insansa claim to deliver, and the valorization of informal institutions as
a potential remedy for state and market failures (Ferguson, 2007), Project
Insansa’s business model depends on ‘gig practices’ of flexibility, irregu-
lar work and insecurity that reinforce the conditions of vulnerability and
marginality that BoP initiatives claim to ameliorate. Framed as indepen-
dent ‘entrepreneurs’, Project Insansa workers lack contracts and have no
official status as employees within the company. They are paid on a com-
mission basis, are excluded from the benefits and protections formal em-
ployees enjoy, and assume responsibilities for corporate functions such as
recruitment and skills acquisition. Glossed over as entrepreneurs despite
their economic vulnerability, BoP sellers in Project Insansa face a regulatory
sleight of hand similar to that affecting digital platform workers; although
embedded in informal enterprise networks rather than digital connections,
sellers for Project Insansa are turned into a kind of low-tech gig worker
doing informal work for formal sector firms. While Insansa sellers may ex-
perience a form of market inclusion, the nature of this inclusion is better
understood as a process of adverse incorporation, in which the possibili-
ties for security and accumulation are circumscribed by the terms on which
workers are incorporated into the BoP market (Hickey and du Toit, 2007;
Wood, 2003).
This article begins by examining how management discourses frame BoP
RTM programmes as a solution to both the inaccessibility and inscrutability
of BoP spaces and the under- and unemployment of informal workers. The
article then describes how Food Co. engages with various local enterprise
networks and partnerships with local NGOs to cut costs and shift financial
2. This was reinforced in discussions with managers and in a presentation we attended in 2014
that stated that this model, through its use of partners, provided ‘Lower costs, strong social
networks, and deep insights into customers and communities’.
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and security risks onto workers. In particular, we examine three key func-
tions that workers assume, enabling the firm to operate in this new space
remotely while deflecting risks away from the corporate bottom line: secur-
ity and access; income and credit risk; and social protection. We show how
the discourse of entrepreneurial autonomy and efficiency, championed by
the Insansa model of mutual capitalism, legitimates this transfer of risk, yet
belies the understanding of workers seeking an enduring, ‘formal’ employ-
ment relationship with Food Co. The article concludes by interrogating what
an inclusive market built on a social infrastructure of informal, precarious,
low-tech gig work suggests for private sector pursuits of ethical capitalism.
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID
In the late 20th century, as global supply chains extended across the world,
subsuming territories and workers in vast (often exploitative) webs of pro-
duction and trade, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement
emerged to champion a model of humane capitalism that was moral as
well as profitable (Blowfield and Murray, 2008; Dolan and Rajak, 2016b;
Rajak, 2011). Coinciding with this shift was C.K. Prahalad’s The Fortune
at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits (2005),
which placed poverty reduction at ‘the heart of strategic business think-
ing’ (Sharmin et al., 2014: 42). Prahalad argued that multinational corpor-
ations (MNCs), facing saturated markets in industrialized nations, could off-
set sluggish growth rates, earn profits and reduce poverty, firstly by mar-
keting goods and services to the 4 billion people excluded from the reach
of global markets, and secondly by providing the (largely informal) unem-
ployed with income-earning opportunities as workers and entrepreneurs.
This proposition, dubbed BoP 1.0, quickly gained favour in business
circles and spawned several high-profile MNC RTM programmes.3 Yet a
schism soon emerged between businesses’ financial objectives and the so-
cial improvements they sought to realize in BoP communities. Scholars
began to deride BoP 1.0 programmes as a ‘form of corporate imperial-
ism’, a well-intentioned but misguided plot to sell unnecessary consumer
goods to the poor (Simanis and Hart, 2008: 2, see also Arora and Romijn,
2012; Borchardt et al., 2020; Chliova and Ringov, 2017; Faria and Hemais,
2017; Karnani, 2007). As a result, subsequent generations of BoP strate-
gies have moved beyond selling to the poor to: co-creation and business
co-venturing, known as BoP 2.0 (Simanis and Hart, 2008); an emphasis on
well-being and sustainable development that conceptualizes BoP ventures as
3. These include Unilever’s Project Shakti in India, JITA in Bangladesh, BP in India, Nestlé’s
‘My Own Business’ programme in Central and West Africa, SC Johnson & Commu-
nity Cleaning Services in Kenya and P&G’s PUR in Uganda, among others.
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part of broader innovation ecosystems, presented as BoP 3.0 (Caneque and
Hart, 2015; Chmielewski et al., 2020; Mason et al., 2017); and ICT-enabled
innovations linking informal enterprises with MNCs, framed as BoP 4.0
(Borchardt et al., 2020; Ilyas et al., 2020). Project Insansa reflects the ambi-
tions of BoP 2.0, selling conventional branded goods and using non-digital
connections to achieve ‘social embededdness’ through cross-sector partner-
ships and ‘contextualized solutions’ that foster co-production and ‘native
capability’ to unlock informal systems (Hart and London, 2005: 33).
An array of studies has examined the affordances of different generations
of the BoP model (Chmielewski et al., 2020; Hart and London, 2005; Kolk
et al., 2014; Mason et al., 2017; Seelos and Mair, 2007; Simanis and Hart,
2008); however, they largely overlook how corporations navigate the risks
of developing new markets in areas where deficits in infrastructure (roads
and electricity), weak regulatory systems and a lack of intermediaries ren-
der formal distribution strategies honed in higher-income, information-rich,
Western-style markets ineffective and costly (Khanna and Palepu, 2010;
Mair et al., 2012). These infrastructural failures, which generate risk and un-
certainty for formal firms, are framed in the language of institutional voids
(Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Schuster and Holtbrügge, 2012).
Yet what business characterizes as institutional voids are not, in fact,
spaces marked by an absence of institutions; rather, they lack recognized
formal institutional arrangements. As Mair et al. (2012: 820) observe:
‘[W]hereas many studies view institutional voids as “empty” of specific
institutions … voids occur amidst institutional plurality and are the inter-
mediate outcome of conflict and contradiction among local political, com-
munity, and religious spheres’. As Bothello et al. (2019: 1505) argue: ‘the
term institutional voids occludes from analysis other obvious and rich insti-
tutions’. BoP markets, for example, boast vibrant market economies consti-
tuted through myriad informal institutions, including trade networks, manu-
facturing clusters, community associations, service user groups, religious
organizations, and so forth (Meagher, 2007), which belie the corporate con-
ceptualization of the BoP as an institutional vacuum.
This diverse informal institutional landscape constitutes a ‘social infra-
structure’ at the bottom of the pyramid. Building on Simone’s notion of
‘people as infrastructure’ (2004), ethnographic studies have highlighted the
ways in which social networks come to plug the gaps left by the absence
of formal material infrastructures, enabling the exchanges that support the
perpetuation and reproduction of life in informal economies (De Boeck,
2012; Doherty, 2017; Xiao and Adebayo, 2020). Through the lens of so-
cial infrastructure, scholars have examined how cash-strapped post-colonial
states with poorly functioning public systems ‘devolve “infrastructure onto
labor”’ (Doherty and Brown, 2019: 8), enrolling the labouring bodies of in-
formal workers to close the gaps in public services, from waste (Doherty and
Brown, 2019; Fredericks, 2018) and water (Anand, 2017), to financial ser-
vices (Kar, 2018; Kear, 2016; Tooker and Clarke, 2018). Appropriating the
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social networks of informal economies is also a strategy of corporate accu-
mulation at the bottom of the pyramid (Dolan and Roll, 2013; Huang, 2017),
observed in industries from consumer goods and financial services, to food
and energy. Dolan and Roll (2013), for example, describe how MNCs lever-
age social networks and other solidarities at the bottom of the pyramid as in-
frastructure for product development, sales and distribution (see also Cross
and Street, 2009; Meagher, 2018) while Maurer (2012) and Meagher (2018)
show how telecoms utilize informal social infrastructures of shops, customer
trust networks and sub-agent networks as a system through which to dis-
tribute financial services to the ‘unbanked’.
As social networks fill gaps in market and distribution infrastructure, they
enable companies to ‘govern at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181), ob-
viating the onus of direct management and offsetting institutional risks by
outsourcing ‘liabilities for failure’ to technologies, institutions and/or other
actors in the business ecosystem (Huber and Rothstein, 2013: 654). As the
following sections highlight, Food Co. shifts responsibility and risk to work-
ers who are neither employees nor independent contractors, absolving the
company of costly labour regulations and reducing labour and monitoring
costs through governing by proxy. This strategy of market (dis)engagement
ensures that Food Co. will capture the gains of market entry while masking
untoward labour practices through the BoP discourse of market inclusion
and entrepreneurial autonomy. This discursive emphasis depoliticizes the
design of the programme and the instrumentalization of social infrastruc-
ture. What emerges is less a mechanism of inclusion than ‘adverse incorpor-
ation’, that is, ‘inclusion on disadvantageous terms’ (Du Toit, 2007: 2; see
also Meagher and Lindell, 2013).
METHODOLOGY
To understand how an RTM programme enters and operates within per-
ceived institutional voids at the bottom of the pyramid, we undertook an
interdisciplinary study of Insansa over a three-year period (2014–17). Over
the course of the research, we conducted seven site visits, interacted with
local programme managers and participants, and observed changes to the
programme as it has matured and evolved under various managers. Meth-
ods included interviews with a range of programme participants, participant
observation of the selling process and briefings by local managers.4 Inter-
views were conducted in two phases. Phase I consisted of semi-structured
interviews with 73 sellers (42 male and 31 female), field officers, pro-
gramme managers in Kenya and NGO partners; additional information was
4. Interviews with micro-entrepreneurs were conducted in Kiswahili or a local language, while
interviews with employees and associates at Insansa and Food Co. were conducted in
English.
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also sought from Food Co. members involved in the programme’s incep-
tion. Phase II, in April 2015, involved 16 photo elicitation interviews, by
which individuals were asked to take and discuss photos that illustrated as-
pects of their work lives. Respondents were evenly distributed by gender
and between rural and urban sites. Additional interviews were carried out
with key managers at a sister BoP programme established by Food Co. in a
different country, to identify shared corporate assumptions and expectations
of how the RTM business model would work in informal settlements and
why. Taken together, these diverse perspectives and methods allowed for a
well-rounded understanding of the programme in practice, and form the ba-
sis of one of the few case studies to closely examine an RTM programme
undertaken by a prominent MNC.
CASE STUDY: PROJECT INSANSA
Project Insansa is Food Co.’s first RTM programme, launched under the cor-
porate banner of mutuality in business as a small experimental pilot pro-
gramme in the slums of Nairobi in 2013. As an ‘uplift-and-empower’ ap-
proach to market-led development (Rajak, 2011: 178), the programme aims
to develop a new market for Food Co. products while delivering social bene-
fits to the un- and under-employed poor in Kenya’s slums and rural areas.
There are currently over 700 sellers involved in Insansa, which is respon-
sible for approximately one-tenth of Food Co.’s regional sales. Workers are
supplied with products by small wholesalers, which are serviced by a Food
Co. distributor; they then distribute these products to micro-retailers, for ex-
ample roadside kiosks, which then sell them on to the consumer. Others in
the programme work as hawkers and sell directly to consumers, often at bus
and matatu stations or on street corners. Workers receive a modest discount
from the wholesaler and capture the narrow margin that comes from their
sales. This margin remains small, reflecting the lack of scope to either push
down the wholesale price or raise the market price.
To address this, workers also receive an end-of-the-month commission
payment via mobile money. While framed by managers as a savings mech-
anism, the commission serves as an incentive to stay in the programme and
accept very low margins on sales. Paying a separate commission has also
enabled Project Insansa to control how much is earned by each sale, as the
commission can be increased without affecting either wholesaler or mar-
ket prices (that is, the margin). When the margin and commission are taken
together, sellers earn approximately US$ 0.15 per sale. In the period 2015–
17, sellers earned on average US$ 55 per month or US$ 1.90 per day from
the programme, significantly lower than the lowest urban national minimum
wage of 13,572.90 Kenya shillings or US$ 126.40 per month (Government
of Kenya, 2018).
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Beyond these direct financial benefits, participants are supported by a field
officer and are invited to regular sessions that often feature motivational
support from the company and guest speakers such as representatives of
microfinance institutions and successful entrepreneurs. These meetings,
which are orchestrated to increase sales and prevent drop-out, instil an ethic
of entrepreneurial self-reliance, and interweave stories of financial success
with Christian faith and perseverance. In 2017, Insansa implemented a busi-
ness skills and mindset training programme. Overall, while some within
Food Co. characterize the purpose of the programme as ‘building human
and social capital’, this arises through the ‘enabling’ environment of the
programme and reflects the company’s discursive emphasis on fostering eco-
nomic autonomy rather than investing in commercial skills training, collec-
tive organization, healthcare provision or other forms of social protection.
Over the period of the study, we observed the increased formalization
and professionalization of the programme, as its leaders sought to make
a place for it within a commercial, sales-driven company, and to manage
the challenges of engaging with workers in the informal economy. This was
marked discursively in 2016, through the decision to call the programme the
Insansa Business (rather than Project). The maturation of the programme
has included the introduction of training, its expansion to more regions, the
reduction of impact measurement and the use of codes of conduct. These
changes have resulted in a shift towards higher-earning male workers; ac-
cording to local managers, these ‘super sellers’, who make up 25 per cent of
participants, generate 66 per cent of sales.5 The programme, which started
with a focus on female empowerment, no longer focuses on gender. Amidst
these changes, Food Co. has continued to mobilize support around the social
purpose of the programme, particularly as a reflection of corporate values,
which has enhanced its recognition both within and beyond the company.
Its reputation for putting ‘social objectives at the heart of business’, coupled
with financial success, has led to the decision to replicate the programme
both in Africa and elsewhere.
WORKING IN KIBERA: BROKERING ACCESS
Kibera is a large, densely populated slum, just southwest of central Nairobi,
consisting of a labyrinth of narrow lanes crowded with low-quality and
makeshift housing. Population estimates range from dramatic claims of over
1 million people to more modest figures in the range of 200,000 inhabitants
(Desgroppes and Taupin, 2011; Karanja, 2010; Warah, 2010). While Kibera
5. As sellers become more professionalized and higher-earning, the programme has been
pushed to navigate the boundaries of the formal and informal sector; for example, Food
Co. is obligated to withhold tax above a certain income threshold — one which top sellers
are now reaching.
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pulsates with urban energy, it has been designated one the most insecure,
unsanitary and dense slums of Africa (Skilling and Rogers, 2017), repre-
sented more by what it lacks than what it possesses (Ekdale, 2014): ‘no
infrastructure, no roads, no sewers, no toilets … no running water, no maps,
no rubbish collections, no jobs’ (Parsons, 2010: 28). Until 2009, Kibera was
a blank spot on maps of Nairobi, devoid of roads or features that depict the
social and economic geography of the place. More recent efforts at mapping
Kibera have been citizen rather than state led.6 Food Co. promoted these
outdated images of uncharted, untamed territory, portraying Kibera as both
a terra incognita and a Hobbesian cipher: the inscrutable disorder of poverty
and informality. Indeed, a Food Co. presentation that we attended, introduc-
ing a sister RTM programme in another slum area, quoted a neo-Dickensian
2012 Associated Press article: ‘[the area] reeks of putrefying trash collected
by its residents for recycling. Half-naked children with grimy faces play on
muddy dirt roads lined by crumbling shanties of tarpaulin walls, cracked tin
roofs’,7 thus maximizing views of the slum as dysfunctional and fundamen-
tally inaccessible.
According to the 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, the overall
unemployment rate in Kibera is 50 per cent, rising to 80 per cent among
youth (Owino, 2020). Only one in five households has at least one stable in-
come earner (WFP and UN-Habitat, 2020). Of those in employment, nearly
half are casual employees, often working in Nairobi’s industrial or service
sectors outside of the slum. The other half find work in the informal sector,
engaging in small-scale trading or activities in the gig economy, or are un-
employed (Gulyani and Talukdar, 2010), making them particularly vulnera-
ble to economic and social risks. Earnings are low and most slum dwellers
earn less than £ 1.70 a day (Jones, 2020).
Food Co.’s effort to gain entry to Kibera began with finding an NGO part-
ner who could serve as a bridge between the formal and informal sectors.
The NGO partner needed to have the knowledge and expertise to navigate
the slum and, importantly, to recruit sellers who would fit the desired en-
trepreneurial profile. NGOs familiar with Kibera are plentiful; since the
1990s, there has been explosive growth in the number of NGOs in Kenya,
extending the territorial reach of services into areas the government is un-
able and/or unwilling to go to (Amuhaya, 2020); there are over 6,000 NGOs
operating in Kibera alone (Clouette and Wise, 2017).
Partnerships between companies and NGOs are seen to overcome the bar-
riers to implementing BoP models by reducing the uncertainty of institu-
tional and infrastructural voids (Webb et al., 2010; see also Hahn and Gold,
6. In 2009, a group of young people in Kibera began to map Kibera using an online mapping
system, launching the movement, ‘Map Kibera’ (Hagen, 2017).
7. This article was published in a number of outlets; a full version can be found
on: www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-from-a-manila-slum-emerges-an-unlikely-
ballerina-2012dec25-story.html
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2014; Reficco and Márquez, 2009). Graesholm’s (2012) study of mobile
phone networks in Kibera, for example, describes how mobile phone oper-
ators collaborated with NGOs as sources of local knowledge to make what
was ‘invisible’ to traditional governance techniques ‘visible’. Of primary
importance for Food Co. was securing partnerships with NGOs that could
facilitate access to individuals who could operate in and navigate Kibera.
At the onset of the programme, a prominent international NGO was se-
lected to broker the corporate–NGO interface and to align Food Co.’s needs
for sellers with the missions of the NGO, specifically to empower and pro-
vide economic opportunities to youth or women — ‘targets’ frequently
prioritized in BoP development initiatives (Dolan and Rajak, 2016a). The
partner NGO brought extensive experience of training female sellers to
distribute and sell Coca-Cola products in Kenya, and had established net-
works of young women interested in business. Contracted by Food Co. for
six months, the NGO initially recruited and, in partnership with Food Co.,
trained over 100 young women. The organization also provided supervisory
support to the participants and monitored their sales, as they embarked upon
their new roles as ‘uplifters’.
However, the promise of the NGO partner did not pan out. According
to an Insansa programme manager, the NGO struggled to recruit partici-
pants that met the needs of the programme, attracting people who expected
‘hand outs’ and ‘sitting allowances’ (Bobkoff, 2016) rather than access to a
labour-intensive selling programme. As a result, the NGO was dropped and
Project Insansa field officers began to work with wholesalers (the small busi-
nesses at which sellers collected Food Co. products to distribute) instead,
going against the conventional wisdom that such MNC–NGO partnerships
are necessary for commercial success at the bottom of the pyramid (Hahn
and Gold, 2014: 1329).
Without the NGO partner, the focus of recruitment became, in the par-
lance of business, ‘leveraging’ the social networks of the wholesalers and
field officers. This shifted the focus away from young women, as the whole-
salers and field officers brought in more men with established distribution
businesses. In addition, the devolution of this responsibility to the whole-
salers and field officers reduced the need of the firm to identify and vet
potential participants, allowing the management team to remain small and
thereby minimize programme costs. As will be discussed below, this shift
appeared to be essential for the operation of the programme, extending be-
yond recruitment.
SETTING THE TERMS: SHIFTING PHYSICAL, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL
RISK
The technique of remote (dis)engagement depends upon utilizing or ‘lever-
aging’ pre-existing social networks to facilitate the programme and address
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the institutional voids that confound standard practice. For formal corpora-
tions, the networks’ appeal lies in their embeddedness. For Food Co., the
wholesaler and seller are viewed as ‘of’ the market that the firm is seeking
to enter, and thus able to operate in areas inaccessible to the firm due to poor
infrastructure or prohibitive conditions for ‘business as usual’ distribution
models. The role of the seller, in particular, goes beyond that of a benevolent
cultural insider, who offers valuable insights into ‘consumer tastes’ and ‘can
identify and interpret local business norms’ (Chelekis and Mudambi, 2009:
413).
Instead, the self-reliant and resourceful seller and the wholesaler were
responsible for absorbing the insecurity and risk that made the area unwork-
able for the firm and its formal employees. Furthermore, recast as ‘micro-
entrepreneurs’, the workers, like contemporary gig workers, do not receive
employment protections. Recalling Du Toit (2007), these are the terms by
which sellers are incorporated — partially, contingently — into the formal
economy and institutions. Indeed, precarity was written into the infrastruc-
ture of the RTM programme itself, which required that workers assume re-
sponsibility for bankrolling all aspects of the business from leveraging cap-
ital to purchasing goods to bearing the costs of their failure to sell them.
In this section, we examine three key functions that workers performed that
allowed the firm to operate in this new space remotely while deflecting risks
away from the corporate bottom line: security and access; income and credit
risk; and social protection.
Physical Risk
Project Insansa workers assume a range of risks that in other circumstances
would be taken care of by ‘formal’ institutions, including both the state and
the firm (Dolan and Johnstone-Louis, 2011). One of the primary risks con-
cerns the insecurity of the area. As a manager in a sister programme ex-
plained, safety concerns keep conventional distributors from going into the
areas serviced by the RTM programme. Of these areas he said: ‘Some dis-
tributors will not go there because some say that after 1 pm, you better get
out of this place because you will already see people drinking along the
road, and you don’t want to be caught there at night time’.8 Food Co. does
not collect data on security incidents experienced by sellers, viewing secur-
ity as an issue that workers manage as ‘independent’ contractors, not one
that should concern the company.
Kibera is widely perceived as a site of disorder and ‘security threats’, with
reports of mugging, robbery, murder and extortion not uncommon. State
media depicts Kibera as a violent and hostile environment, inhospitable to
global business. As one field officer described, ‘we work in the slum areas …
8. Manila, Philippines, August 2017.
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where there is a lot of insecurity and the [Food Co.’s] marketing team is not
able to reach’.9 This view was echoed by a manager at a sister programme
for Food Co. operating in informal settlements, who described insecurity
as a main concern and the use of local sellers as core to the strategy for
obtaining entry:
We target the people in that place already. If you have a [wholesaler] outside that danger
zone, like just in the periphery, you can get one [wholesaler], and this [wholesaler] of course
definitely have connections inside, or they have friends or relatives inside that zone, so we
asked them. Maybe you can encourage them to sell for them inside because the people inside
know that person in the community. The danger level is low. That’s how we are able to
penetrate those areas, especially those extremely dangerous areas.10
The local knowledge, networks and informal institutions possessed by in-
dividuals within the community enable corporate engagement with areas
perceived as ‘extremely dangerous’, obviating the need for additional in-
vestment in security.
Another manager stated that it is simply ‘cost effective’ to have sellers
bring products into these areas that are too risky for a conventional dis-
tributor who does not know or reside in the area, and typically possesses
assets (truck, larger quantities of stock) that render them vulnerable to theft.
Similarly, sellers, who typically hail from surrounding slums, are deemed
accustomed to facing the hazards Kibera poses, drawing protection from
their established networks. As one seller told us, ‘I have lived here for many
years and so many people know me. I don’t worry of security because most
people know me’.11
It should not be assumed, however, that Project Insansa workers are im-
mune to risk (Roever, 2019). In some cases, being known had its disadvan-
tages. A female seller explained: ‘As you walk by the road on your sales
route, most of the idle men by the roads know that you are a seller and
the goods that you are selling are worth some money. So sometimes they
might plan to wait for you while coming back from selling and rob you the
money’.12 Men also experienced security risks, and those who sold high vol-
umes (as the worker quoted below did) often move outside of familiar areas
in which they are known and comfortable. This challenges the assumption
that workers are fully insulated from security concerns.
I did not really know during that time that that’s a very dangerous place, but I had just this,
you know, fate that I want to go in and look around the place. When I go in, people were
looking at me like they wanted to eat me. Even the mothers, like it’s shocking, a mother
would like to …. ‘What are you doing here?’. They’re asking ‘what are you doing here’?
‘Oh, I’m just selling some products’ …. Then after some time when I got out from that
9. Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
10. Manila, Philippines, August 2017.
11. Nyeri, Kenya, December 2014.
12. Dandora, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
Debate: Remote (Dis)engagement at the Bottom of the Pyramid 13
place, thank God. My friend said, ‘You came to that place? Thank God you’re not dead’.
And he said, ‘never go back to that place’.13
Other workers described how they avoided distributing goods via bicycle or
motorbike to minimize the risk of hijacking; ‘someone who is just walking’
is less conspicuous. Doing so, however, reduced how much ground they
could cover and the earnings they accrued. The workers thus not only bore
the risk of bodily harm from crime and insecurity but also shouldered the
associated financial costs.
In structuring the employment relationship, Food Co. places these work-
ers beyond its concern; the company remains detached from the security
risks workers must confront. At the same time, sellers’ precarious working
arrangements fall outside the purview of state regulation (Lindell, 2010).
Their vulnerability is exacerbated by the punitive measures of state and lo-
cal authorities against informal workers in the form of crackdowns, evic-
tions and harassment, leaving sellers held at the boundary of the firm with
no institutional buffers, public or private, against the risks of daily work.
Financial Risk
In addition to shifting responsibility for security risks by positioning work-
ers as independent ‘entrepreneurs’, Food Co. also makes the sellers respon-
sible for the financial risks associated with assuming and extending credit,
both essential practices, and for generating a stable wage. Working on mar-
gins, sellers’ incomes are neither guaranteed nor consistent, and fluctuated
considerably depending on both market demand and their capacity to reach
customers. While the sellers described enjoying the flexibility and auton-
omy that came with the work — as one noted, ‘I can go the time that I want
to go as long as I manage to sell. Like if I was on permanent employment
I wouldn’t have managed to come and meet you here today’14 — concerns
with irregular and unpredictable earnings came up repeatedly in our inter-
views.
As one worker noted: ‘Sometimes you will find that the work has become
difficult. [You] will go out there to sell but [you] end up not selling any-
thing and maybe you want to eat and you do not have money for food’.15
Another echoed this point: ‘Today you might sell this, tomorrow you might
not sell’.16 Thus, though Food Co. provides opportunities to work in an area
of pervasive unemployment, the financial risks of selling a fast-moving con-
sumer good in Kibera were assumed by individual workers, whose precarity
was reinforced rather than alleviated by the unpredictability of the business.
13. Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
14. Dandora, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
15. Dandora, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
16. Dandora, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
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As Bear (2013: 383) points out in another context, outsourcing to informal
workers can devolve ‘financial risks and costs away from capitalists’, ren-
dering ‘workers the bearers of the greatest physical and monetary insecurity’
(see also Cant, 2020; Friedman, 2014; Prentice, 2017).
Furthermore, liquidity constraints and access to capital emerged as a
perennial challenge for workers, who were unable to maintain sufficient lev-
els of stock to ensure a consistent cash flow. Food Co. does not provide
credit to workers to purchase stock, nor to the wholesalers that supply them.
Yet, nearly all workers had to provide their customers with stock on credit,
collecting payment at the end of the day. This is risky; should a customer
fail to pay it is the workers who will be left empty-handed. As one worker
explained: ‘I wouldn’t say there is a way you manage risk because, like, if
for example you gave a customer products on credit, and the following day
when you go to collect the money and find the shop is closed, you are the
one who will bear the loss. I am the one who will go at a loss’.17 Another
echoed this point: ‘Most of them, in fact like 75 per cent of my suppliers
[wholesalers], I give them cash … but my customers, half of them buy on
credit, half of them buy on cash so you see it’s challenging. I am giving more
credit than I am receiving’.18 Sellers also sought to manage the pressure to
reduce the price of the product by offering credit to buyers instead, a strategy
that has become key to maintaining customers, despite the risks.
As relationships between sellers and wholesalers matured over time,
the latter felt more comfortable extending credit. This extension of credit
quickly became essential for the smooth functioning of the programme, even
while wholesalers, like sellers, were entirely detached from the company.
As the margin captured on each sale accounts for just over 5 per cent of the
product cost, a seller would need to be able to purchase US$ 100 of stock to
earn US$ 5 at the end of the day; without credit, this would need to be paid
upfront. However, the reliance on credit from wholesalers places sellers in
a more precarious position, as illustrated in the case of one seller who was
moved to an unknown wholesaler following the closure of her initial whole-
saler, whom she knew well. Without the trust needed to facilitate credit, the
seller lacked the capital to purchase the volume of goods necessary to make
selling viable, pointing to the fragility of an ‘inclusive market’ based on
personal ties. Yet because Insansa keeps programme costs low by depend-
ing on workers’ social ties and access to the informal institutions that enable
markets to function in Kibera, there is little incentive for the programme to
change selling practices or formalize employment. As a result, the gains
made by workers remain low, despite their economic ‘incorporation’ or ‘in-
clusion’ by an MNC.
17. Kagio, Kenya, December 2014.
18. Kagio, Kenya, December 2014.
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Social Risk and Protection
Just as sellers rely on their social networks to manage the physical and fi-
nancial risks that would be shared with employers in standard employment
relationships, many sellers are similarly dependent on social ties of reci-
procity for social protection. Yet social networks of precarious workers are
themselves somewhat precarious, providing limited protection amid con-
stant livelihood pressures. As one Insansa seller described, ‘When I am sick
it is difficult because when I come back I will find my customer has asked
someone else to bring [the product] for them …. I am at risk of losing my
customers’.19 In other cases, economic circumstances compelled workers to
continue selling despite poor health: ‘I rest a lot nowadays because I had
to go through an operation. My doctors have been telling me I shouldn’t be
doing what I am doing but now you can see the situation’.20 Though friends
and family members or other sellers sometimes stepped in to assist in cases
of illness or absence, this was not always possible, leaving sellers who live
day-to-day exposed to significant financial and health risks.
Often the main breadwinners, the loss of daily income, coupled with the
lack of employer or legal safety nets, not only threaten sellers’ ability to pur-
chase provisions and repay debts they have incurred, but also have knock-on
effects on the welfare of their families. COVID-19 has intensified these vul-
nerabilities, as sellers have been forced to either navigate the densely pop-
ulated neighbourhoods and congested streets of Kibera to earn an income,
or bear the economic costs of staying at home and remaining safe (Owino,
2020). While Food Co. has continued to enjoy buoyant global sales, the sell-
ers have no cushion — social protection, savings, employment benefits —
to weather the risks COVID poses to their livelihoods. The view that sellers
are external to the firm absolves the firm from the responsibility to engage
these issues despite the implications for the welfare of sellers. For example,
when sellers experienced misfortune (such as illness, product damage, or
theft), Food Co. asserted that what they needed was encouragement rather
than help with cash flow to overcome the immediate crisis. As one national
sales manager reasoned: ‘Sometimes some of them get mugged, their prod-
ucts stolen, some fall sick for months on end because their bag is heavy, they
are being rained on. If they’re sick, we might not give them money, but even
giving them a call and telling them “you’ll get well soon” is quite enough to
keep them going’.21
If sellers would be supported fully by the company, ‘they’d make it a
habit’, and thus the company resisted taking on responsibilities for work-
ers that resemble employment relations, or arguably a ‘mutual’ relationship,
with the sellers.
19. Nyeri, Kenya, December 2014.
20. Karatina, Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
21. Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
16 Kate Roll, Catherine Dolan and Dinah Rajak
To ward off the development of such ‘habits’ among undisciplined sell-
ers, Project Insansa sought to inculcate them with an entrepreneurial ra-
tionality where risk-taking, productivity and accountability were individu-
alized. If sellers failed to succeed in the Insansa programme, they argued,
it was because they had not seized the opportunity given to them: ‘You’re
going to work hard and you’re going to benefit and you’re going to grow
and we’re going to give you opportunities, and it’s your choice whether you
take those opportunities or not, fine’, said one Food Co. manager.22 These
sorts of moral injunctions lay the failure to sell products at the feet of sell-
ers who were deemed not sufficiently entrepreneurial to succeed, their gen-
erative power hobbled by a lack of commitment, verve and perseverance
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Chang, 2010).
This ‘sink or swim’ narrative lies at the crux of an entrepreneurial logic
that marks human frailties such as illness and misfortune as character traits
rather than events, a failure to overcome adversity that posed a risk to busi-
ness’s bottom line. Yet Food Co.’s abdication of responsibility, its unwill-
ingness to extend sick leave or labour protections to Insansa’s sellers, ex-
acerbates this risk: ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ who couldn’t cut the mustard in-
evitably dropped out, requiring Insansa to seek disciplined and ‘enterpris-
ing’ subjects to replace them — with all the financial costs this entailed.
RISK OF DEPENDENCE: ENTREPRENEURIALISM, OBLIGATION AND
ABDICATION23
An essential feature of BoP interventions is the celebration and prioritiza-
tion of ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘self-reliance’ as both catalyst and product
of market expansion in institutional voids (Dolan and Rajak, 2016a; Dolan
and Roll, 2013; Kaplinsky, 2011). Insansa typifies this, establishing Food
Co.’s role as one of enabler rather than provider, mirroring the gig worker in
the platform economy. In stark contrast to CSR and charity, the company’s
investment comes not in the form of material or infrastructural benefit, but
rather in the intangible promise of individual transformation by galvaniz-
ing an ethic of entrepreneurial self-sufficiency and extending opportunity to
sellers ready to act on it.
Accordingly, programme managers in Kenya debated whether to demand
a fee for training aspirant sellers, a first step towards the individual owner-
ship and autonomy required of an entrepreneur. Ridding recruits of the ex-
pectation of hand-outs remains important in this cultivation of self-reliance
and the concomitant rejection of corporate responsibility. ‘When we went to
launch [the programme], everybody wanted a sitting allowance’, one sales
manager noted, dismissing the expectation among Insansa trainees that they
22. Nairobi, Kenya, April 2015.
23. This section draws from Dolan, Huang and Gordon (2021).
Debate: Remote (Dis)engagement at the Bottom of the Pyramid 17
would be compensated for income lost from their current work for atten-
dance; ‘no, if I give you a job which is selling this product, where you keep
the money for you, and I give you this much at the end of the month, I’ll
make you a better person than you getting 200 sitting allowance’.24
Yet while responsibilizing the individual sharpens the boundaries between
Food Co. and its sellers, liberating the company from the obligation to in-
vest in their welfare, it does little to defray the expectations workers placed
upon the company. Food Co.’s invocation of entrepreneurial self-reliance
sits uneasily with sellers who seek durable connections with the company,
in which Food Co. has an obligation to help them overcome the daily chal-
lenges of their work. Sellers routinely request items like gumboots for the
mud, raincoats, umbrellas and bags to protect their products from the rain;
more efficient forms of transportation such as bicycles and motorcycles; and
branded ware that would better advertise the product and lend the appear-
ance of professionalism to their work. Even branded ID cards are sought
in an effort to assert their connection to a recognized corporation; however,
these requests raised issues amongst the management regarding their impli-
cations for liability, a pressing concern as sellers in Nairobi lacked licences
and were regularly hassled by the City Council during the early years of the
programme.25
Requests for items that would facilitate their work — and the underlying
patronage model sellers drew on — are partly based on established prece-
dent. ‘Because we have been given enough gifts like T-shirts and bags to
carry our products, maybe now they can help us in transport because we
cover a large area, and the existing profit we get has to be used for trans-
port, and we are left with nothing’, a seller explained.26 Sellers also hope
that their loyalty would eventually lead to permanent employment with the
company, enabling them to benefit from the security of income and benefits
Food Co. provided to in-house employees. As one worker asserted: ‘They
are good people. They told us that we put effort in the work and they can
employ us; when an opportunity comes, they will give us. That is why we are
working hard because we know they will not just leave us like that’.27 Yet
while sellers understand their commitment to Food Co. in reciprocal, and
arguably ‘mutual’ terms, anticipating that their loyalty will result in perma-
nent employment and their ‘rightful share’ (Ferguson, 2015) of company
profits, Food Co. remains wedded to the conceptual opposite: a relationship
devoid of obligation and enduring ties.
24. Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
25. This issue has now been resolved by licensing sellers through their stockists. A broader
challenge that has not been resolved is the prohibition on hawking; there are currently over
100 participants in the programme classified by managers as hawkers.
26. Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
27. Nairobi, Kenya, December 2014.
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While Insansa sellers seek the social recognition and material benefits a
formalized, dependent relationship with the company would confer, none of
Food Co.’s RTM projects are designed to incorporate sellers within the com-
pany as workers with rights, benefits and responsibilities. Rather, the com-
pany sees its contribution as the cultivation of resourceful and self-sufficient
sellers, who could drive forward development under their own steam. In-
deed, Food Co.’s anticipatory claims of prosperity, opportunity and mate-
rial gains are out of step with the earnings of workers, which barely meet
their needs, let alone the ‘declarations of dependence’ from kin (see also
Dolan and Rajak, 2016a, 2018). Despite Food Co.’s discursive exhortations
of mutuality, in practice we find that what is on offer for sellers is neither
the transformative conditions of financial security nor empowerment, but
an opportunity to take their chances in a rigged game; in exchange for the
chance to activate their initiative, perseverance and self-reliance in pursuit
of upward mobility, sellers assume the risks of doing so themselves. These
are the terms of incorporation.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, numerous businesses have spearheaded bottom of the pyra-
mid ventures to access hard to reach markets while positioning themselves
as empowerers of those who live in poverty. This article analysed how a
global food retailer attempted to forge a BoP route to market programme in
Kibera, an area perceived as devoid of institutional and formal market in-
frastructure and characterized by economic uncertainty. The case highlights
how corporations use sellers to solve the problems of access and risk that
define these areas as beyond the reach of formal distribution channels. We
asked: in what ways did this programme seek to address the company’s per-
ceived infrastructural vacuum at the bottom of the pyramid? And to what
effect on sellers themselves?
In contrast to an earlier era of corporate investment typified by the classic
‘company town’ where the firm establishes its presence and power precisely
through the provision of infrastructure and social welfare in the vacuum
left by failures in public provision (Carstens, 2001), Food Co. brokers ac-
cess through a strategy of remote (dis)engagement, seeking ‘collaborators’
outside the boundaries of the firm and banking on the capabilities and net-
works of Kibera’s informal economy to manage such voids and weather the
risks that such uneven partnerships entail. These informal local networks,
with established forms of communal and reciprocal economic activity, serve
as compensatory institutions for the deficits in financial, governmental and
technical infrastructures the corporation faces in tapping frontier markets.
Remote (dis)engagement enables the firm to take advantage of social cap-
ital at the bottom of the pyramid while liberating the firm from the costs
and risks of building the material, social and economic infrastructures of
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inclusion required for sustainable job markets and stable economic develop-
ment. Crucial to this unequal relationship — confounding corporate claims
of mutuality — is the devolution of risk from the corporation to the individ-
ual subject. Animated by a logic of entrepreneurialism, with its emphasis
on autonomy, resilience and resourcefulness, Project Insansa is unburdened
from the obligation to extend formal or institutional protections, such as a
living wage, insurance, or social protections, which define working life at
the core of the company. Food Co.’s performance of ‘inclusive’ capitalism
thus contains an inherent contradiction: the firm engages with informal net-
works and institutions to fill gaps in market infrastructure at low cost but
ring-fences the boundaries of its economic obligations, its moral stance to-
ward the informal poor defined not by inclusion but by (dis)engagement.
As the case of Insansa indicates, the possibility of success at the bottom
of the pyramid is directly tethered to a seller’s capacity to shoulder risks,
whether of crime and insecurity or cash constraints and market fluctuations.
Sellers often have little hedge against such risks beyond their networks of
kin, friends and co-workers, their success in the programme contingent upon
the social infrastructure available to them. But social ties are a finite resource
and the constant need to call upon them to cope with the demands of the pro-
gramme puts stress on sellers and their networks, while doing little to foster
access to ‘resource-rich’ networks that might enhance their opportunities
(Ansari et al., 2012: 815).
The sellers are essential to these programmes both with regard to the value
their networks generate for the firm, and in the way the discourse of en-
trepreneurship and the enterprising subject legitimizes this shifting of risk.
The neoliberal and depoliticizing trope of the ‘entrepreneur’ celebrates not
only their hard work and resourcefulness but also their appetite for risk and
uncertainty, the latter written into the experience of entrepreneurship itself.
Like other ‘gig’ work models, Insansa performs regulatory arbitrage, recast-
ing workers as entrepreneurs to evade obligations to labour. And like other
gig RTM programmes, Insansa can deliver a new and highly flexible eco-
nomic opportunity. But these are compromised gains, where the poor bear
the financial, legal and contractual risks associated with entering and work-
ing in institutional voids. As noted, these risks stem from the dynamic of
remote (dis)engagement, as well as from the much-vaunted process of en-
trepreneurship itself, its core values of self-reliance and autonomy ‘respon-
sibilizing’ informal workers to forge their own path out of poverty.
Despite their transformative claims, RTM programmes like Insansa can-
not address conditions of exclusion and precarity because they fundamen-
tally depend on informality and exclusion from social protections in order
to function. There is no Project Insansa without precarity; there is no Project
Insansa without the cost savings found by shifting core functions to workers.
The programme’s embrace of remote (dis)engagement and entrepreneurial-
ism, which are premised on an ‘ethic of detachment’ (Cross, 2011), do noth-
ing to advance real market inclusion, where workers’ rights and protections
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are upheld by labour regulations. The broader social, political and economic
conditions of the informal economy, and the precarity therein, remain, for
the corporation, usefully unchanged.
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